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PRISONERS FOR SALE: MAKING THE THIRTEENTH
AMENDMENT CASE AGAINST STATE PRIVATE PRISON
CONTRACTS
Ryan S. Marion*
INTRODUCTION
Prison overcrowding has evolved into a critical social problem. Per capita, the
United States incarcerates more individuals than any industrialized nation in the
world.' In 2006, for example, the number of people "under supervision" in the
nation's criminal justice systems topped 7.2 million.2 As a result, states spend bil-
lions of dollars to house, supervise, and counsel inmates. Adding to this problem,
criminal law reform is slow and often nonexistent, and states have been forced to find
other ways to remedy the burden that incarceration places on taxpayers and treasuries.
Starting in the 1980s, one such remedy has been for states and localities to enter
into contracts with private corrections construction and management firms.4 These
companies are publicly traded and exist solely for the purpose of making profits
from prison contracts with local, state, and federal authorities. In fact, Corrections
Corporation of America (CCA), the oldest and most well-known private prison com-
pany, is listed on the New York Stock Exchange and recently reported nearly $1.5
billion in total revenue.6 CCA's success led to the creation of similar entities across
the United States, taking the private prison industry from a one-man show to a billion
dollar market in just two decades.7
* J.D., William & Mary School of Law, 2010; B.A., summa cum laude, with Honors,
The College of William & Mary, 2007. 1 dedicate this Note to my parents for helping me with
every step of the journey, and to my friends for all their support and inspiration.
' Chris Weaver & Will Purcell, Comment, The Prison Industrial Complex: A Modern
Justification for African Enslavement?, 41 How. L.J. 349, 349 (1998).
2 Darryl Fears, New Criminal Record: 7.2 Million: Nation's Justice System Strains to
Keep Pace With Convictions, WASH. POST, June 12, 2008, at A9.
3Id.
' See Judith Greene, Banking on the Prison Boom, in PRISON PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES
MONEY FROM MASS INCARCERATION 3, 13-16 (Tara Herivel & Paul Wright eds., 2007).
5 Tara Herivel, Introduction in PRISON PROFITEERS, supra note 4, at ix, x ("While there
are many industries that make money from prisons, the private prison industry is unique in that
it is the only such industry founded solely in order to profit from prisons.") (emphasis added).
6 CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2008), available
at http://investor.shareholder.com/cxw/annuals.cfin (follow "2007 Annual Report" hyperlink)
[hereinafter CCA 2007 ANNUAL REPORT].
See Ahmed A. White, Rule ofLaw and the Limits of Sovereignty: The Private Prison in
Jurisprudential Perspective, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 111, 112 (2001).
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To grasp the constitutional concerns presented by the private prison industry,
one must first understand how it makes a profit. First, a state or locality, either by
statute or decree, approves a new prison and solicits bids from private prison com-
panies. Once a prison company secures a contract, it builds the type of correctional
facility requested and operates it for the govemment. The latter task requires the
prison company to hire personnel (e.g., prison guards, wardens, and psychologists) and
provide the same services as a state-owned prison.' Criminal justice scholars and legal
professionals have generally commented on the benefits of privatization, stating that
competition among firms results in better facilities for the inmates as well as lower
costs to taxpayers.9
Private prisons also mimic their public counterparts in one interesting aspect:
prison labor. As in state jail, prisoners confined by the state to a privately owned
facility must perform menial tasks for little to no pay.1" The point of such work,
consequently, is reformation and rehabilitation. By doing such work in the private
context, however, prisoners directly contribute to the profit-making function of the
corporation. " At the very least, therefore, inmate labor in private prisons constitutes
"involuntary servitude."' 2 If the state is characterized as "contracting out" inmates
to these corporations who subsequently aid the prison in earning corporate revenue,
the system begins to resemble a modem day form of slavery.
The Thirteenth Amendment states, "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to theirjurisdiction."' 3 Since
its passage, the "Punishment Clause" has been a bane for prisoners who argue that they
are being subjected to conditions resembling slavery or involuntary servitude. Finding
support from the Slaughter-House Cases,4 federal courts have held that the main pur-
pose of the amendment was specific-to abolish African-American chattel slavery and
its incidents. As such, the Punishment Clause renders any current prisoner's argument
that they are slaves or involuntary servants void and frivolous. 5 In these cases, the
8 See the discussion of a current California contract with CCA in Marc Lifsher, Increase
in Inmates Opens Door to Private Prisons, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2007, at A1, for an illus-
tration of the private prison contract process.
9 See generally JAMES AUSTIN & GARRY COVENTRY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, NCJ 181249, EMERGING ISSUES ON PRIVATIZED PRISONS 15-18 (2001).
'o See MICHAEL A. HALLETr, PRIVATE PRISONS IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL RACE
PERSPECTIVE 65 (2006) (describing use of private, for-profit convict labor not only within
the prison itself, but also to provide goods through contracts with companies such as IBM,
Motorola, Victoria's Secret, and Compaq).
" Weaver & Purcell, supra note 1, at 349.
12 HALLETT, supra note 10, at 1-3 (linking the concept of "involuntary servitude" in the
Thirteenth Amendment to modem day for-profit imprisonment).
'3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (emphasis added).
14 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
"5 See infra Part ll.B.
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Court either implicitly assumes or directly states that private prison inmates have no
Thirteenth Amendment claim without further elaboration.
This Note argues that, given the history of the Thirteenth Amendment and the
current state of private prison contracts, inmates working in these privately owned
and operated facilities do indeed have a constitutional claim. The Punishment Clause
does not, in fact, justify the current relationship between government entities and pri-
vate prison companies. In its current form, the state is handing over control of pris-
oners to private companies who, in turn, use the prisoners to improve their facilities
and increase profits, thus indirectly benefiting these companies' shareholders. Such
a system of private, unpaid use of labor too closely resembles the slave system that
the Thirteenth Amendment sought to abolish, and was not the punishment scheme
envisioned by its drafters when they carved out an exemption for convict servitude.
The argument will proceed in several parts. Part I will outline the development
of the penitentiary system in the United States by focusing on how the private sector
has been used to aid the state in its responsibility to rehabilitate and punish criminals.
The Thirteenth Amendment's contributions to prison organization, the Southern
"convict leasing" system that resulted, and the modem private prison industry's
emergence will also be discussed, along with the Supreme Court's early Thirteenth
Amendment jurisprudence, which simultaneously killed and partially revived the
amendment as a protector of civil rights.
Part II, discussing current judicial treatment of the Thirteenth Amendment, will
outline the private prisoner's possible constitutional claim. Utilizing this discussion,
this Note will contend that the Supreme Court would be justified in rendering the
current private prison industry unconstitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment's
prohibition against "slavery [and] involuntary servitude.' 16
Finally, Part III will propose a legislative solution, modeled on Virginia's admin-
istrative code, that will allow the private prison industry to exist and make profits while
avoiding any suggestion that its existence violates prisoners' civil rights against slave-
like, compulsory labor.
I. PRIVATE CORRECTIONS AND THE "PUNISHMENT CLAUSE": A HISTORY
A. Early American History to the Civil War
During the early colonial period, imprisonment itself was not even considered
a form of criminal punishment.'7 Instead, jails were simply holding areas where the
accused awaited trial and the condemned awaited actual punishment, which could be
16 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONsTIUTIoN: A BIOGRAPHY 360 (2005) ("When-
ever one person improperly held another in bondage, the amendment applied: 'slavery [and]
involuntary servitude.. . shall [not] exist."') (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, §1).
"7 Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment andPrivate Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437,450 (2005).
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the stockade, banishment, the gallows, or other such punitive measures-" British
colonial governments employed private citizens to build and subsequently run these
jails.'9 To supplement their usually meager fee, these jailers often took bribes, charged
prisoners for meals, and provided cheap accommodations.
20
Nevertheless, these private jailer contracts, and the often undesirable outcomes
that resulted from them, were accepted by the authorities due to the overarching need
to cut housing costs. 2' That same desired goal also paved the way for the primitive ver-
sion of the modem corrections system. As early as 1555, England sought to decrease
the cost of housing their debtors by assigning them to privately owned "workhouses."'22
Prisoners, during their brief period of confinement, would work to offset the costs
of holding them as well as to supplement the jailer's small government salary.23
Those in favor of such establishments, however, offered another, more powerful
justification-that "confinement at productive labor [is] a means of checking vagrancy
and other evils."24 Indentured servitude as a method of criminal punishment and social
improvement thus began its evolution and became so popular that it eventually estab-
lished itself in the American colonies as well.25 The British Crown transported
several thousand criminals to work off their debts to society on cotton and tobacco
plantations, a practice that proved to be economically advantageous for the Empire
while theoretically reducing crime in the mother country by removing its criminal
elements.26 The colony of Georgia, in fact, was established as just such a penal colony
for England's prisoners and poor debtors.27
Finding merit in this vision of the prison as a redeeming institution, William Penn
created a distinctively American philosophy on criminal punishment.28 Penn, Quaker
'8 Id.; MARTIN P. SELLERS, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF PRIVATE PRISONs: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 49 (1993) ("Until the early seventeenth century, the main punish-
ment choices continued to be corporal, capital, or banishment.").
"9 Dolovich, supra note 17, at 450; SELLERS, supra note 18, at 48-49.
20 Dolovich, supra note 17, at 450 ("The less money spent on upkeep, the more money
the jailor made....").
21 SELLERS, supra note 18, at 49 ("Countries could not afford to operate [prisons and
workhouses] or build them.").
22 Id. at 48-49.
23 Id. at 49.
24 Id. at 48.
25 Dolovich, supra note 17, at 450.
26 HALLETr, supra note 10, at 41-43.
27 See PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 89 (1997) ("[Georgia colony
founder James Oglethorpe] was a rich English philanthropist... who came to America as a
result of his passionate interest in prison reform. He was particularly interested in helpless
men imprisoned for debt and believed they ought to be freed and allowed to work their way
to solvency on American land.").
28 SELLERS, supra note 18, at 49; White, supra note 7, at 124-25 ("America generally is
regarded as the birthplace of the modem prison-the prison, that is, as a place for large-scale,
long-term, and punitive incarceration.").
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leader and founder of the Pennsylvania colony, abhorred the traditional European
view that only corporal and capital punishment were effective.29 Believing that the
criminal could be redeemed if he were taken out of society and trained in good
morals, Penn advocated for the use of the prison as punishment itself.3 In 1682, he
pushed for the creation of "houses of correction as a major instrument of deterrence
and justice."31 This effort resulted in the Great Law of 1682, which required "'every
county within the Province of Pennsylvania and territories there unto belonging [to]
build or cause to be built a house of restraint, labor and punishment' for persons con-
victed by law. 32 Under this scheme, recouping the costs of housing prisoners be-
came a secondary motive compared to the greater desire for the state to use work for
rehabilitative purposes.33
Following the American Revolution, the new Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
expanded upon its founder's vision by building the first "penitentiary" in 1790.34 Con-
sidered a major reform in punishment at the time, the Walnut Street Prison required its
inmates to work "in order to attack idleness, thought to be a major cause of crime." '35
The major difference between Penn's new rehabilitative penitentiary system and the
punitive system that had previously existed, therefore, was that under Penn's system
work was imposed to further the state's police power objective of enforcing public
morals rather than create a private profit motive.36 As such, punishment and its
accoutrements became state functions.
The "Pennsylvania" system of punishment, as it was called, became greatly
accepted in the post-revolutionary period.37 The Pennsylvania system was more
humane, uniquely American, and more in line with the Enlightenment ideals that
informed the United States' founding.3" Penitentiaries were praised and readily
29 SELLERS, supra note 18, at 49.
30 Id. ("[Houses ofcorrection] engendered a major change in punishment from traditional
methods such as torture and death, to detainment, work, and penance in order to rehabilitate
convicts.").
31 Id.
32 Id. (quoting Pennsylvania's Great Law of 1682) (emphasis added).
13 See Dolovich, supra note 17, at 450-51; William P. Quigley, Prison Work, Wages,
and Catholic Social Thought: Justice Demands Decent Work for Decent Wages, Even For
Prisoners, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1159, 1161-62 (2004).
31 Quigley, supra note 33, at 1161.
35 Id
36 Stephen P. Garvey, Freeing Prisoners 'Labor, 50 STAN. L. REv. 339, 348 (1998) ("With
the endorsement of the indefatigable Dr. Benjamin Rush,... silence and labor would be the
twin engines of moral reform inside this latest innovation[: the Walnut Street prison]. Silence
enlisted the prisoner's own conscience to provide his punishment."); Quigley, supra note 33,
at 1161-62 ("The focus was primarily on the moral rehabilitation of the prisoner and only
secondarily on the idea of having prison work defray some of the costs of incarceration.").
" SELLERS, supra note 18, at 49-50.
38 Cf John V. Jacobi, Prison Health, Public Health: Obligations and Opportunities, 31
AM. J. L. & MED. 447,458 (2005). Jacobi states: "Imprisonment as punishment, then, was
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adopted in nearly every state during the 1820 prison reform.39 In one 1829 report, for
example, the City of Boston praised the penitentiary system, stating, "It is productive,
it is healthful, it teaches convicts how to support themselves when they leave prison,
it is reformatory, and is consonant with republican principles."''4 In putting the pris-
oner to work, reformers and legislators believed that they could resolve the country's
crime problem by removing its criminals from their "corrupt" environments and trans-
forming them into proper, productive American citizens.4'
In addition to rehabilitative labor, the Pennsylvania system also emphasized soli-
tary confinement and silence among prisoners as part of their personal penances.42
Prisoners were not to make eye contact or speak to each other, and were to spend their
time either working or studying the Bible.43 This isolation rendered prisoners' labor
grossly inefficient and thus undesirable for the private sector." The Pennsylvania
system was incompatible with the cooperative nature of private employment and with
the hierarchy of management structures.45 As a result (and as intended), state officials
became the sole controllers of prison labor.
The growing popularity of the penitentiary, however, soon created a system to
compete with the Pennsylvania model: the Auburn system.46 Named after the Auburn
Prison in New York and also called the "congregate" system, this model retained the
rehabilitative motives of the Pennsylvania variant by requiring silence and segre-
gation into private cells. 47 However, solitude was eventually abandoned in favor of
a "collective, factory-like," form of labor.48 Whereas Pennsylvania-style prisons could
produce only small amounts of household goods such as firewood, woven baskets,
and repaired shoes, Auburn inmates were able to produce everything from factory-
quality shoes to furniture.4 9 Recognizing the potential for recouping the state treasury,
a humanitarian reform in post-revolutionary America.... Early in the nation's history, it was
anticipated that the substitution of imprisonment as a relatively humane punishment for more
brutal forms would reduce crime rates. [As juries had often refused to convict due to the bru-
tality of hanging or whipping, the penitentiary system's predicted] end ofjury nullification
would lead to more certain consequences for criminal acts and all Americans would choose to
obey the law-embodying the Enlightenment ideal of the clear-eyed rationalist." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
"9 Id. (discussing the 1820s prison reform by states, who built penitentiaries as reactions
to workhouses' failure to reduce crime and the brutality of prison conditions).
40 Quigley, supra note 33, at 1162 (quoting Boston Pris. Disc. Soc. Rept., 34 (1829)).
41 Jacobi, supra note 38, at 458.
42 SELLERS, supra note 18, at 49; White, supra note 7, at 125.
43 SELLERS, supra note 18, at 49.
44 White, supra note 7, at 125.
45 Id.
46 SELLERS, supra note 18, at 49-50; White, supra note 7, at 125.
47 SELLERS, supra note 18, at 49; White, supra note 7, at 125.
48 AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 9, at 9-10 ("[I]nmates were often engaged as laborers
and craftsmen in private-sector activities."); White, supra note 7, at 125.
41 SELLERS, supra note 18, at 49; White, supra note 7, at 125.
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more states adopted the Auburn model during the nineteenth century, turning prison
officers into factory managers whose main goal was to make the prison a self-sustaining
entity via profit."
Despite the greater focus on prison labor as a profit producer, states insisted that
officials retain their tight control over both the prisoners and the nature of their work.5
Reformation and reintroduction into society-not money-were the main drivers
of penitentiary labor. 2 This ideal remained true despite the fact that governments
eventually encouraged more involvement from the private sector.5 3 States using both
models would often award contracts for the sale of prisoners' goods and services, but
ensured that the inmates were given fair pay (from which the cost of food, lodging,
and clothes were deducted). 4 In 1838, for example, the New Jersey legislature passed
an act that required labor from inmates in order to offset the costs of prison upkeep
and established for each prisoner an account from which wages and deductions were
respectively credited and debited.55
Even with the Auburn system's collaborative, more businesslike model, private
entities were still discouraged from displacing the state in its role as controller of in-
mate labor. Though inmates could be leased out to perform services and their goods
sold on the open market, the law ensured that any profits arising out of a contract with
a private entity ended up in the state's hands. The relevant agency could then redis-
tribute it to the state treasury and the prisoners as it saw fit.56 As Professor White com-
ments, "[W]hile the Auburn system could profitably employ labor, it was only rarely
" Dolovich, supra note 17, at 450-51 ("In the early penitentiaries, prison labor was intro-
duced as part ofrehabilitative programs, but it quickly became the means through which state
governments could recoup the costs to the state treasury of imprisoning criminals."); see also
Quigley, supra note 33, at 1162 ("Within a few decades ... the motive to make money
emerged as the primary goal of prison labor .... ").
1, AusTiN & COVENTRY, supra note 9, at 9-10 (discussing the state's role in negotiating
contracts for goods, as well as appointing the head jailer and deciding which of the government
contractors could supervise the work).
52 See SELLERS, supra note 18, at 50-51 (discussing the premium New Jersey placed on
prisoners becoming "self-sufficient" as factory workers as well as making a profit); see also
Garvey, supra note 36, at 348-49. Indeed, reformation and rehabilitation continued to be
viewed as the goals of incarceration until the beginning of the private prison boom in the
1980s. Chief Justice Burger's observations regarding the need to combat "idleness" and create
"factories within fences" to do so illustrates this fact. SELLERS, supra note 18, at 47.
13 AusTiN & COVENTRY, supra note 9, at 10; Dolovich, supra note 17, at 451 (describing
contractors' increasing roles from originally supplying only raw materials to the Auburn prison
in New York to controlling Louisiana's entire penitentiary under a lease).
54 SELLERS, supra note 18, at 49.
5 Id. at 50.
56 Id. at 49-50 (describing the "prison labor" laws passed in New Jersey and New York that
required the profits made by prisons via private contracts be used to make the prison "self
sufficient" or to remunerate the prisoners).
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that this involved direct private control."57 The state still acted as a middleman
between the prisoners and the private sector who wished to exploit their labor.
Moreover, all antebellum attempts to fully involve private industry failed miser-
ably and were generally considered unwise. The most infamous example occurred in
California. In 1852, the state converted a private prison ship in San Francisco Bay
into the country's first privately constructed and operated prison-San Quentin.58
Only four years later, and despite the private contractors' contentions that cost-cutting
justified their operation of the facility, a number of mismanagement scandals con-
vinced the state government to take over the prison.59 A California newspaper even
opined, "whatever it cost, a final end had to be put to the system of farming out the
management of the state convicts." ' This sentiment was in accord with the state's
general perception that "regardless how much money it might save the taxpayers, a
private contract was no way to run the state prison."' These sentiments indicate that,
by the time the Civil War erupted in 1861, the American philosophy on punishment
strongly favored the public prison to private inmate labor regimes.62
B. The Thirteenth Amendment and "The Incidents of Slavery"
The next government action to affect prison labor originated from the need to
rid the United States of its most ostensible form of oppressive labor control--chattel
slavery. Largely rooted in notions of racial superiority, the South's slave system
also provided the promise of acquiring social standing via the ownership of "human
capital.'6 3 Poor whites often aspired to own slaves as a symbol of economic independ-
ence, and as a result, supported their wealthy counterparts' efforts to enforce anti-
education and fugitive slave laws despite the fact that they were just as dominated
by the plantation system.'
Due to these cultural norms, the abolitionists and Radical Republicans who even-
tually gained control of the federal government recognized that simply ending the prac-
tice would not be enough to end "slavery." Once the Emancipation Proclamation and
the Civil War's outcome cemented slavery's demise, Congress began to debate the
7 White, supra note 7, at 125.
58 Lifsher, supra note 8.
19 AusTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 9, at 10.
60 Id. (quoting KENNETH LAMOTr, CHRONICLES OF SAN QUENTIN: THE BIOGRAPHY OF
A PRISON 74 (1961)).
61 id.
62 White, supra note 7, at 125-26 (discussing the American move away from private incar-
ceration and toward the modem public prison, and juxtaposing that system with the subject of
the next section--the South's slave plantations, which were "private prisons unto themselves").
63 ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM: A
LEGAL HISTORY 11-12 (2004).
64 Id. at 11-12, 19.
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form and substance of the Thirteenth Amendment.6 5 Congress's main goal from the
outset was to permanently end unpaid, unjustified, and coercive labor for the benefit
of private parties (and everything associated with it) within the United States." One
legal historian describes the legislators' attitudes in this manner:
The incidents of servitude that the Thirteenth Amendment wiped
away were endemic to the entire culture. They were neither con-
fined to plantations nor even just to the South. Constitutional pro-
tections for slavery percolated into accepted ruthlessness against
blacks. They encountered barriers to freedom in their work,
family life, child rearing, career pursuits, mobility, and entertain-
ment. The Thirteenth Amendment ended all of these incidents
of servitude and provided the United States Congress with the
enforcement power to prevent them.67
With the immediate goal of phasing out African slavery and the long-term goal of
ending private oppression in general, the Radical Republicans set to work drafting
an acceptable version of the amendment.68
During the congressional debates, various legislators on both sides revealed their
intentions regarding this amendment. Most importantly, they wanted language that
would end chattel slavery once and for all.69 However, they anticipated that the
Thirteenth Amendment would disallow the state from introducing new forms of
involuntary servitude that resembled the former practice.7 ° Senator Henry Wilson,
a lifelong abolitionist, stated:
[The Thirteenth Amendment] will obliterate the last lingering
vestiges of the slave system; its chattelizing, degrading, and bloody
codes; its dark, malignant, barbarizing spirit; all it was and is,
65 See Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Thirteenth Amendment and Slavery in the
Global Economy, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 973, 1005-06 (2002), for a succinct overview of the
Reconstruction Congress's concerns in the discussions on the Thirteenth Amendment,
including the need to outlaw peonage as well as slave-like systems that "degraded labor" and
"corrupt[ed] [the] morals" of work.
66 See TSESIS, supra note 63, at 38 ("Radical Republicans sought to make the amendment's
scope sweeping. They intended that it provide Congress with the national authority to enact
laws that would assure that freedom would not be a hollow word but a national commitment
vested with substantive protections.").
67 Id. at 22-23.
68 See id. at 38-48.
69 See Wolff, supra note 65, at 1005-06.
70 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36,71 (1873) (stating that the purpose ofthe Civil
War amendments was the "freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of
that freedom, and the protection.., from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised
unlimited dominion over him.").
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everything connected with it or pertaining to it . . .. [The
Amendment] will make impossible forevermore the reappearing
of the discarded slave system, and the returning of the despotism
of the slavemasters' domination."
Senator Wilson also had a strong belief that the Thirteenth Amendment should not
touch only African-Americans but every citizen, a conviction reinforced by his upbring-
ing. He was bom on a poor farm in New England, and once had himself been "bound-
out" by his family to earn money.72 In the House of Representatives, Representative
Ebon Ingersoll agreed that the proposed amendment should also affect "the seven
millions of poor white people who live in the slave States but who have ever been
deprived of the blessings of manhood by reason of... slavery."73
The resulting text of the amendment became one of the most succinct-and
broad-amendments in the United States Constitution: "Neither slavery nor involun-
tary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their juris-
diction."74 Most current scholars agree, due to its broad language, the amendment was
meant to apply "[w]henever one person improperly held another in bondage."75 This
implies that the drafters intended the Thirteenth Amendment to end any and all forms
of bondage resembling the culture of private control that existed in the plantation
slavery system.
As will be discussed in detail later, courts interpreting this amendment have used
its inclusive wording to hold that the race of the individual has no weight as far as his
or her protection against slavery and involuntary servitude is concerned.76 Whether
the state or a private actor imposes that servitude has been held to be similarly irrele-
vant.77 The Thirteenth Amendment imposes a positive duty upon the states to eradi-
cate de facto slavery whenever they recognize it within their borders.78
A curiosity of this otherwise far-reaching amendment, however, is that it includes
one exception that became quite important, especially in the South, for the status of
prisoners and prisons themselves in the years following the Thirteenth Amendment's
71 TSESis, supra note 63, at 42 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1324 (1864)).
72 Id. at 43.
73 Id. at 44.
74 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
7' AMAR, supra note 16, at 360. Arnar also suggests that the Thirteenth Amendment could
be read, "Slavery [and] involuntary servitude ... shall [not] exist." Id.
76 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 72 (1872) (establishing that the Thirteenth
Amendment applied to citizens regardless of their race); see also infra Part I.C.
77 See Heidi Boghosian, Applying Restraints to Private Police, 70 Mo. L. REV. 177, 207
& n.249 (2005) ("A notable exception [to the general notion that most constitutional rights
are protected only against governmental action] is the Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibits
any form of slavery or involuntary servitude, whether public or private.").
78 AMAR, supra note 16, at 360.
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adoption. The Punishment Clause allowed involuntary servitude "as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted."7 9 This portion of the
amendment is usually simply recited as part of the text, and hardly analyzed in court
opinions or studies. It is either ignored or simply accepted as an absolute condition.8s
Several reasons may exist for its existence in the amendment. The first, and most
easily acceptable, is that nineteenth-century prison labor was not considered an inci-
dent of slavery.81 The Southern slave codes deprived innocent people of pay for their
work and the ability to choose their own lifestyle, receive an education, and enjoy
the rights and privileges allowed to free citizens under the Constitution. 2 It was this
deprivation of life and liberty by private citizens, and upheld by the states, that the
Thirteenth Amendment sought to excoriate from American soil.8 3 A similar motiva-
tion informed the drafting and passage of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.' Prisoners, on the other hand, had to be convicted of a crime before they fell
under the Punishment Clause's exception. Assuming that a prisoner has no claim to
lack of due process, federal courts have largely been in agreement that the state is
justified in depriving him or her of his life and liberty (which would include the right
to choose the type of work performed and negotiate compensation).85
There exists, however, an alternative and equally plausible reason for the inclusion
of the Punishment Clause within the Thirteenth Amendment. Though slavery has
been considered a form of punishment throughout history, the prison system as it
79 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
80 Compare Murray v. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 911 F.2d 1167 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)
(stating that compelling an imnate to work without pay is not unconstitutional due to the
Punishment Clause without further explanation), with Loving v. Johnson, 455 F.3d 562 (5th
Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (discussing plaintiff's Fair Labor Standards Act claims without men-
tioning the Thirteenth Amendment at all, despite similar facts and a citation to Murray).
8" See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 69 ("The exception of servitude as a punishment for
crime gives an idea of the class of servitude that is meant. The word servitude is of larger
meaning than slavery... and the obvious purpose was to forbid all shades and conditions
of African slavery.").
82 See TSESIS, supra note 63, at 22, 106. The traditional list of fundamental rights, privi-
leges, and immunities of free citizens may be found in the classic case Corfield v. Coryell,
6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
83 TSESIS, supra note 63, at 22-23.
' See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 553 (1896)
(Harlan, J., dissenting), Justice Harlan argues: "[The Thirteenth Amendment] having been
found inadequate to the protection of the rights of those who had been in slavery, it was
followed by the Fourteenth Amendment .... These two amendments, if enforced according
to their true intent and meaning, will protect all the civil rights that pertain to freedom and
citizenship."
85 See AMAR, supra note 16, at 359 ("Neither states nor the federal government would
be allowed to... permit bondage to creep back onto American soil (save as a criminal punish-
ment, subject to due process).") (emphasis added); infra Part II.C; see also Slaughter-House,
83 U.S. at 116 (Bradley, J., dissenting) ("This right to choose one's calling is an essential part
of that liberty which it is the object of government to protect ... ").
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developed in the United States separated those two concepts in the American mind-
set. 6 Punishment has both a rehabilitative and retributive purpose in American (and
now largely Western) thought, whereas antebellum slavery valued dominion, financial
gain, and retribution alone. 7 In fact, Hallett claims the wording of the amendment
itself created this cognitive separation. 8' He writes, "That the American Thirteenth
Amendment simultaneously abolished slavery and initiated 'involuntary servitude'
in the United States speaks to the duality of slavery and punishment in the American
context." 89 Unlike the ancients and Renaissance Europeans, who used slavery to pun-
ish offenders and prisoners of war, American history created a culture which treated
slavery and criminal justice as completely dichotomous institutions.90
C. The Post-Reconstruction Era, "Convict Leasing, " and Thirteenth Amendment
Interpretation
The first real test of the Thirteenth Amendment came during Reconstruction.
Embittered by their shattered agrarian economy and social structure, Southern states
found the Punishment Clause to be an excellent loophole for reinstating the plantation
economy and its racial hierarchy.9' "Convict leasing" was the first instance of total
private control over the inmate's labor and person, but Southern legislatures never-
theless justified it by borrowing a line from the Pennsylvania and Auburn prison
models.92 The devastated Southern economy left legislatures unable to bear the costs
of prison upkeep, proponents argued, and thus inmates must be required to work to
pay their own costs.93 Also, the South was in need of a large pool of cheap labor,
86 HALLETT, supra note 10, at 4.
87 See TSESIS, supra note 63, at 19-20 (describing the sense of "superior purpose" and
"wealth" derived from the slave culture); Quigley, supra note 33, at 1173 (discussing U.S.
Catholic bishops' views that the nation's criminal justice system must change from punitive
and retributive to emphasize "restorative justice," and a "constructive and rehabilitative
purpose").
88 HALLETT, supra note 10, at 4.
89 Id. But see Quigley, supra note 33, at 1165 (writing that the Thirteenth Amendment
"allows slavery and involuntary servitude as punishment for crimes.") (emphasis added).
90 See SELLERS, supra note 18, at 48 (discussing the application of slavery and other punish-
ments by the ancients under the "eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth" moral imperative,
as well as the introduction of the English workhouse). In an 1850 article, Frederick Douglass
highlighted this duality to show the contradiction in American social thought regarding slavery.
He stated that "[e]very slaveholder in the land stands perjured in the sight of Heaven, when
he swears his purpose to be, the establishment ofjustice ... for every such slaveholder knows
that his whole life gives an emphatic lie to his solemn vow." TSESIS, supra note 63, at 16.
9' HALLETr, supra note 10, at 1-2.
92 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
9' See Weaver & Purcell, supra note 1, at 355 (discussing the South's "criminal surety"
statutes, which "allowed those convicted of minor offenses to have their fines [or imprisonment
costs] paid off.., in exchange for labor").
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making inmates a ready resource.94 Laws were passed allowing prisons to lease their
prisoners out to plantation owners and other private firms, who provided for inmates'
needs and controlled the type of work performed as long as they fulfilled their con-
tractual obligations. 95
The actual, pernicious reason for the convict lease system, however, can be found
in the way it gathered inmate laborers. Realizing that the recently freed slaves often
had no homes and could not find a job, many Southern states passed vagrancy laws
providing for the arrest and imprisonment of "' [riogues and vagabonds, idle or disso-
lute persons, common night walkers, [p]ersons who neglect their calling,' [and] 'all
able-bodied male persons over eighteen... who are without means of support." 96
While race was not specifically mentioned, this definition was meant to apply to (and
was enforced against) African-Americans. 97 A large number of African-Americans
were consequently punished for their poverty, only to be leased out to white land-
owners and subjected to a condition essentially similar to the one they had endured
under slavery. 98
These cruelties, combined with other private prison mismanagement and abuse
scandals occurring in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, caused the use
of private contractors in incarceration to fall into disfavor.99 Curiously, however, the
courts during this time period never intervened on Thirteenth Amendment grounds
to stop convict leasing, the San Quentin affair, or the Arkansas inmate coal-mining
incident. In fact, no cases were brought under this amendment in the prison labor
context. This, however, may be largely due to America's viewpoint at the time re-
garding thepurpose of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Punishment Clause's role
in fulfilling it."
94 Dolovich, supra note 17, at 451.
9' Mari Matsuda, Professor of Law, Georgetown University School of Law, Planet Asian
America, Address Before the Asian Law Caucus Dinner (Mar. 2000), in 8 ASIAN L.J. 169,
174 & n.22 (2001).
96 Nancy A. Ozimek, Reinstitution of the Chain Gang: A Historical and Constitutional
Analysis, 6 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 753, 762 (1997) (quoting FLA. STAT. §§ 3570-71 (1905), a
typical vagrancy statute).
9' Id.; see also HALLETr, supra note 10, at 53 (discussing passage of "pig laws" aimed
at imprisoning poor blacks for stealing food as well as the general Southern feeling of the
"Negro crime problem").
98 HALLETT, supra note 10, at 2.
99 AusTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 9, at 11; see also Charles W. Thomas, Correctional
Privatization in America: An Assessment ofIts Historical Origins, Present Status, and Future
Prospects, in CHANGING THE GUARD: PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE CONTROL OF CRIME 73
(ALEXANDER TABARROK, ed., 2003) (describing the "brutality" of convict leasing and other
"strikingly callous and exploitative" forms of private contractor collusion in imprisonment
throughout American history).
"o See supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text (relating Reconstruction era's view of
punishment versus slavery).
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Although the Thirteenth Amendment's proper interpretation was questionable
during Reconstruction, it received its first serious treatment by the Supreme Court
in 1872-just as the era was drawing to a close. In the Slaughter-House Cases, a
group of private butchers challenged a Louisiana statute banning animal slaughter
in all but one section of New Orleans, which effectively granted a monopoly to one
area slaughterhouse.'' As the regulation essentially required petitioners to work for
the city or not at all, one of petitioners' arguments was that the law subjected them
to "involuntary servitude" and hence violated the Thirteenth Amendment. 2
Justice Miller, writing for the majority, quickly dispensed with this argument.
He responded to the butchers' claim by appealing to the legislative purpose. 3 Giving
modem readers a glimpse into Reconstruction America's attitudes, Justice Miller
related the exact "purpose" to which he was referring:
[N]o one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading pur-
pose... lying at the foundation of each, and without which none
of them would have been even suggested; we mean the freedom
of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that free-
dom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen
from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised un-
limited dominion over him."
As slavery's abolition was the end to be achieved, Miller continued, protection of the
butchers' interest in pursuing their occupation was invalid as a Thirteenth Amendment
claim. "5 The prohibition against involuntary servitude was meant only to end "slave-
like relations," and more specifically, those tied to the experience of African slaves
in the United States. 10 6
In subsequent Supreme Court cases, Justice Miller's application of the Thirteenth
Amendment was held to be authoritative when parties other than African-Americans
sought relief for oppressive conditions. As such, the Court effectively inhibited the
'0' Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 57-60 (1872).
102 Id. at 66.
03 Id. at 72 ("[In any fair and just construction of any section or phrase of [the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, or Fifteenth] [A]mendments, it is necessary to look to the purpose which we
have said was the pervading spirit of them all, [and] the evil which they were designed to
remedy....").
'0' Id. at 71 (emphasis added).
101 Id. at 72; TSESIS, supra note 63, at 66.
106 TSESIS, supra note 63, at 66; see also Julie Chi-hye Suk, Equal By Comparison:
Unsettling Assumptions of Antidiscrimination Law, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 295, 328 (2007)
(arguing that the Slaughter-House court focused on the American memory of slavery as the
proper scope of the Thirteenth Amendment rather than a general application of the terms
"slavery" and "involuntary servitude").
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amendment's use as an expander of civil rights in the late nineteenth century.° 7 Re-
straint was, of course, both politically and culturally expedient at the time, as Congress
and the nation were trying to end Reconstruction and its abolitionist ideals." 8
Justice Bradley's opinion in the CivilRights Cases,"° known mostly for its rulings
on the Fourteenth Amendment's scope, also affected Thirteenth Amendment juris-
prudence by differentiating the two amendments from each other."' The Thirteenth
Amendment, Bradley argued, "simply abolished slavery" and gave Congress the
power to regulate private individuals' actions in order to eradicate it. "' On the other
hand, the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal government the power to nullify
state laws that either abridge citizens' privileges and immunities or deprive persons of
life, liberty, or property without due process." 2 This private/state action dichotomy
rendered the two amendments "different," and thus the Fourteenth Amendment could
not be used to strike down slavery-related actions against the states.1 13
From Slaughter-House's limitation of the Thirteenth Amendment to its historical
purpose and the CivilRights Cases' separation of it from state actions, the amendment
became all but dead letter.' "' With these two cases firmly rooted in American juris-
prudence, the Fourteenth Amendment instead emerged as the major vehicle for civil
rights protection, but even it was not successful until Brown v. Board of Education"5
and the later passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act."6 Indeed, Justice Bradley seemed
stalwart in his conviction that the Thirteenth Amendment protected only the "funda-
mental" rights of African-Americans such as freedom and citizenship against their
former masters. Consequently, the Court did not uphold the "social" rights of every
American, such as the right to eat in a restaurant or, for this Note's purposes, the right
to perform private work for wages.117
107 TSESIS, supra note 63, at 67.
108 Id.
109 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
11o See TSESIS, supra note 63, at 67.
... Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 23.
112 Id.
"13 Id.; see Rebecca E. Zietlow, Congressional Enforcement of Civil Rights and John
Bingham 's Theory of Citizenship, 36 AKRON L. REV. 717,744 n. 159 (2003) (arguing that the
Supreme Court struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 in the Civil Rights Cases because
it was (1) beyond Congress's Thirteenth Amendment enforcement powers as "not directly
related to slavery," and (2) beyond the Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement power due to
its applicability to private, not state, action).
114 See TSESIS, supra note 63, at 74.
15 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
l6 See, e.g., TSESIS, supra note 63, at 73 ("The Civil Rights Cases were a missed oppor-
tunity to further the racially tolerant vision of the Thirteenth Amendment. The nation had to
wait until 1964 to end discrimination in public accommodations.").
"' Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22 (delineating the "fundamental" rights of citizens as
the rights to "make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to inherit,
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Removing the Thirteenth Amendment from claims against the states, along with
the Punishment Clause itself, may have caused the lack of response from the Supreme
Court toward convict leasing and other attempts at the privatization of state punish-
ment. "' There was, however, a glimmer of hope for those who took a more expan-
sive view of the Thirteenth Amendment's potential. Even in the Slaughter-House
Cases, after declaring the end of African slavery to be the Amendment's purpose,
Justice Miller conceded that the Thirteenth Amendment could be utilized to shield
other groups from economic exploitation. 19 He wrote:
We do not say that no one else but the negro can share in this
protection.... [I]t forbids any other kind of slavery, now or here-
after. If Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system
shall develop slavery... within our territory, this amendment may
safely be trusted to make it void. 20
At least, then, the Supreme Court acknowledged that Congress did not intend for the
amendment to stop at ending African bondage. Instead, its broad wording allowed
future legislatures and courts to dismantle any system that may arise which resembled
slavery.'21
Justice Harlan reminded the Civil Rights Cases Court of this feature of the
Thirteenth Amendment in his dissent.' He asserted that the federal government, by
virtue of the amendment's second section, had the prerogative to rid the country of
the "badges and incidents" of slavery and involuntary servitude. 23 Even as early as
1867, Justice Chase held that "indenture" of any form was illegal as a violation of the
Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which was enacted under the
purchase, lease, sell and convey property"); see Denise C. Morgan & Rebecca E. Zietlow,
The New Parity Debate: Congress and Rights ofBelonging, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 1347, 1392-93
& n.233 (2005) (separating economic and social rights such as "the right to a living wage"
and equal access to public education from the Reconstruction era definition of "civil rights").
"8 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
"9 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 72 (1872).
120 Id.
12 Id. ("Both the language and spirit of these articles are to have their fair and just weight
in any question of construction."); Michael H. LeRoy, Compulsory Labor in a National
Emergency: Public Service or Involuntary Servitude? The Case of Crippled Ports, 28
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 331, 355 (2007).
.22 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 33 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The terms of the
Thirteenth Amendment are absolute and universal. They embrace every race which then
was, or might thereafter be, within the United States.") (emphasis added).
123 Id. at 35 ("That there are burdens and disabilities which constitute badges of slavery
and servitude, and that the power to enforce... the Thirteenth Amendment may be exerted...
for the eradication, not simply of the institution, but of its badges and incidents, are propositions
which ought to be deemed indisputable.").
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amendment's enforcement section.124 The Thirteenth Amendment, he argued, estab-
lished freedom "as the constitutional right of all persons in the United States. ' 12 5 The
Thirteenth Amendment, therefore, was to be considered just as great a guarantor of free-
dom as the Fourteenth Amendment or any of the incorporated constitutional provisions.
As the twentieth century dawned, the Thirteenth Amendment had been rendered
ineffective and convict leasing was in full swing. By the 1920s, however, the system
was falling out of favor, but not due to Thirteenth Amendment concerns.' 26 Instead,
white paid laborers felt that they were losing valuable opportunities to the cheap labor
provided largely by black inmates. 127 To address this problem, constituencies looked
to the executive and legislative branches. In 1905, for example, President Theodore
Roosevelt issued an executive order preventing federal agencies from contracting with
convict labor on government projects.128 Congress later passed the Hawes-Cooper
Act of 1929, allowing states to ban the importation of convict-made goods from other
states. 129 Responding to further pressure from suffering Americans during the Great
Depression, the New Deal Congress passed the Ashurst-Sumners Act in 1935. This
act not only banned convict-made goods, but also made their interstate importation a
federal crime. 30
Due to these measures, convict leasing and private prison operation eventually
faded away at the state level, though some form of it existed in Southern counties
until the Civil Rights Era.'3' From the early 1940s until the early 1980s, there was
"virtually no private sector involvement in correctional services.' ' 132 At both the
state and federal levels, the operations and administration of prisons was "delegated
to governmental agencies, authorized by statute, staffed by government employees,
and funded solely by the government. '
Though this period was admittedly "brief' in American history and one not ini-
tiated by the federal courts using the Thirteenth Amendment, subsequent decisions
from the 1940s to the 1980s revealed that the Court was changing its view on both
the Amendment and its applicability to other servile and custodial relationships.'34
124 In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247).
125 Id.
126 Weaver & Purcell, supra note 1, at 359-60.
121 AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 9, at 11; Weaver & Purcell, supra note 1, at 359-60.
128 AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 9, at 11.
129 Id.
130 Quigley, supra note 33, at 1162; see 18 U.S.C. § 1761(a) (2006).
131 White, supra note 7, at 133.
132 Jeff Sinden, The Problem of Prison Privatization: The US Experience, in CAPITALIST
PUNISHMENT: PRISON PRIVATIZATION & HUMAN RIGHTS 39, 41 (Andrew Coyle et al. eds.,
2003) [hereinafter CAPITALIST PUNISHMENT] (emphasis added).
133 Id.
134 White, supra note 7, at 134 (arguing that the public sector only "enjoyed a near
monopoly in the business of incarceration" for "a relatively briefperiod from about the 1940s
through the 1970s").
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Pollock v. Williams,'35 decided by the Supreme Court in 1944, defied the Slaughter-
House/Civil Rights Cases tradition and directly applied the Thirteenth Amendment
to strike down a Florida statute.'36 In fact, the Court found the Thirteenth Amendment
argument to be so powerful, it did not even find it necessary to reach the petitioner's
Fourteenth Amendment claim.'37
The particular statute in question was a so-called "peonage" law, which made
it a state crime, subject to imprisonment and a fine, for a laborer to refuse to repay
his employer's advance when leaving employment.'38 A private corporation signed
a contract with Pollock promising a $5 advance, but had not paid it by the time
Pollock left the job."39 Despite this fact, Sheriff Williams and the State of Florida
claimed that he was still under contract and thus subject to criminal penalty."4 The
majority declared that the peonage law amounted to "involuntary servitude," forcing
a person to labor against his will, and thus was facially unconstitutional on Thirteenth
Amendment grounds.' 4 '
In the Pollock opinion, Justice Jackson, after finding the Thirteenth Amendment
to be effective in invalidating laws requiring compulsory labor to pay off a debt or
obligation, made an interesting observation on the Punishment Clause. Commenting
on this exception for involuntary servitude, he stated:
The undoubted aim of the Thirteenth Amendment... was not
merely to end slavery but to maintain a system of completely free
and voluntary labor throughout the United States. Forced labor
in some special circumstances may be consistent with the general
basic system of free labor. For example, forced labor has been
sustained as a means of punishing crime, and there are duties such
as work on highways which society may compel.... Whatever
of social value there may be, and of course it is great, in enforcing
contracts and collection of debts, Congress has put it beyond de-
bate that no indebtedness warrants a suspension of the right to be
free from compulsory service.'42
The only form of forced labor compatible with the post-Reconstruction system,
Jackson seems to be arguing, is public forced labor accompanying criminal punish-
ment. Combined with the fact that Pollock was drafted during a time when control
13s 322 U.S. 4 (1944).
'36 Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50
DUKE L.J. 1609, 1655-56 (2001).
'3" Pollock, 322 U.S. at 5-6.
138 Goluboff, supra note 136, at 1655.
"9 Pollock, 322 U.S. at 6; Goluboff, supra note 136, at 1655.
'40 Pollock, 322 U.S. at 5-6.
14 Id. at 7-9, 24.
142 Id. at 17-18 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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of the prison system had reverted completely to public authorities, the Court would
have believed that such was the norm in criminal punishment as well as the one
envisaged by the Thirteenth Amendment's drafters.'43
Another breakthrough came with the Court's 1968 decision, Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co. 1" Handed down during the Civil Rights Era, Jones affirmed that the
Thirteenth Amendment is a separate and effective tool in protecting civil rights-
though maybe not as effective as the amendment that directly follows it.'45 The
majority, per Justice Stewart, utilized the "badges and incidents" language to find that
citizens may bring discrimination claims against private actors under the Thirteenth
Amendment and § 1982.'"
The Court did so by first asserting that the Thirteenth Amendment is self-executing:
"'By its own unaided force and effect,' the Thirteenth Amendment 'abolished slav-
ery, and established universal freedom."" 47 Second, in contravention to the Civil
Rights Cases, the Court held that the Enabling Clause of the amendment granted
Congress the unqualified power to abolish all institutions and practices resembling
slavery instituted by public andprivate actors.148 Despite this victory for the Thirteenth
Amendment, it came too late to address the problem of prison labor for private par-
ties. By the 1960s, the state governments were back in control of the nation's ever-
increasing incarceration rates. 49 It would not be long, however, before new criminal
issues and the sheer numbers of incarcerated citizens caused the states to seek new
methods of imprisonment.
14' See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text. In the passage regarding the criminal
punishment exception to involuntary servitude, Justice Jackson cited to a Supreme Court case
from 1914, which also mentions the state as the only authority capable of imposing involuntary
servitude upon criminal conviction:
There can be no doubt that the State has authority to impose involun-
tary servitude as a punishment for crime. This fact is recognized in the
Thirteenth Amendment .... Of course, the State may impose fines and
penalties which must be worked outfor the benefit of the State, and in
such manner as the State may legitimately prescribe.
United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 149 (1914) (emphasis added).
1- 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
14' TSESIS, supra note 63, at 82 ("[Jones] interpreted the [Thirteenth] [A]mendment as a
broad protection of civil liberties.").
'- See 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2000) (granting "[a]ll citizens of the United States" the same
property rights as "white citizens").
147 Jones, 392 U.S. at 439.
148 Id. at438 ("It has neverbeen doubted... 'that the power vested in Congress to enforce
[the Thirteenth Amendment] by appropriate legislation' includes the power to enact laws 'direct
and primary, operating upon the acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by State legislation
or not."') (internal citation omitted) (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,20, 23 (1883)).
149 White, supra note 7, at 134 (stating that public entities had a "near monopoly" in incar-
ceration from the 1940s to the 1970s).
2009]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
D. The Private Prison Boom in the 1980s
During the Reagan presidency, the United States famously announced its "War
on Drugs." Prior to the 1980s, drugs were considered more of a public health con-
cern. 5° President Reagan, however, advocated for stricter federal criminal laws
against the production, possession, and distribution of narcotics. His efforts resulted
in the passage of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act and the Sentencing Reform
Act, which eliminated federal parole and established mandatory minimum sentences
for drug-related crimes.'5 ' While dramatically increasing the number of inmates in
federal prisons, these acts also started a national trend for state politicians who wanted
to be seen as "tough on crime." '52 By the end of the decade, the prison population of
the United States had experienced a 115% increase.'53
The rise in prison populations and a harsher criminal justice system were com-
plemented by yet another trend from the Reagan era: privatization. The widespread
belief that the government should get "off the backs" of the American people ex-
tended from health care to trash collecting, and the criminal justice system was no
exception. '54 Believing that the rising prison population could be accommodated more
safely and efficiently by competition in the marketplace, two prominent Tennessee
politicians, Tom Beasley and Doc Crants, founded Corrections Corporation of America
(CCA) in 1983.15 The concept was inspired by the federal government's first privati-
zation project in 1979 when it hired a private company to construct and operate alien
detention centers for the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 56 Headquartered
in Nashville, CCA currently controls a majority of Tennessee penitentiaries as well
as the greatest portion of market share in private corrections nationwide.'57 By the
mid-i 990s, CCA and its primary competitor, Wackenhut Corrections, controlled 75%
of the private prison market. 5 ' In 2007, CCA reported nearly $1.5 billion in net in-
come.'59 The company operates 65 prison facilities, including 41 entirely owned by
ISO HALLETT, supra note 10, at 54.
'' Sinden, supra note 132, at 42.
112 Id. (providing the "Three Strikes legislation," first passed in California in 1994, as an
example of proactive punishment legislation among the states).
' Phillip J. Wood, The Rise of the Prison Industrial Complex in the United States, in
CAPrrALIST PUNISHMENT, supra note 132, at 16, 17-18 (outlining the "decade-by-decade"
percentage increase in incarceration rates, including a 53% increase in 1970s, 115% in the
1980s, and a further 77% increase in the 1990s).
154 Sinden, supra note 132, at 41.
155 Greene, supra note 4, at 11.
156 See Wood, supra note 153, at 18; see also AUSTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 9, at 12
(stating that, by 1984, the INS had contracts with two private prison companies to detain illegal
aliens, and the number had expanded to seven by 1988).
157 Greene, supra note 4, at 11-12. For a thorough historical overview of CCA see id. at
11-18.
15' Dolovich, supra note 17, at 459.
159 CCA 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 2.
[Vol. 18:213
PRISONERS FOR SALE
CCA, in 19 states and the District of Columbia. 6 ' In total, they have a design capacity
of 78,000 beds.161
The growth of entities such as CCA can be attributed directly to the states' per-
ceived need for them as a cost effective response to the incarceration of an increas-
ingly higher rate of criminals. After entering into contracts, states then begin shipping
inmates to the new prisons, which may sometimes be out of state. 162 By simply pro-
viding the contract money and not having to worry about salaries for prison guards or
maintenance, states believe that private prisons provide large savings to their trea-
suries while still accommodating the ever-growing number of incarcerated criminal
offenders.'63 Also, private companies are perceived as more efficient in constructing
and operating these facilities.64 Finally, these prisons are often considered cleaner and
safer than their state-run counterparts. 165 As a result, the number of state-contracted
private prison inmates has risen almost every year since the industry's inception,
reaching 87,860 in 2007.166 This was a 3.3% increase from the previous year, and con-
stituted 7.4% of the state inmate population nationwide. 167 An even higher increase
is apparent in the federal prison system, with the number of private prisoners increas-
ing by 12.1%. 16' Given the history of its criminal punishment philosophy and the
constitutional imperative to prevent private exploitation of citizens, it is appropriate
to question this relatively new privatization trend in American criminal justice. 169
Specifically, one must ask whether a privately held prisoner has a colorable claim
against the state and the private prison corporation on the grounds that their incar-
ceration and involuntary servitude violate the Thirteenth Amendment. 70
160 Id. at 14.
161 Id.
62 Lifsher, supra note 8 (describing a recent California prison contract with CCA to relocate
prisoners to an Arizona prison at a cost to the State of $63 per inmate per day).
163 See Sinden, supra note 132, at 43 ("According to privatization advocates, pressure from
shareholders to provide dividends will lead to more cost-effective operations."); Boghosian,
supra note 77, at 191-93.
'" Sinden, supra note 132, at 43.
161 See Lifsher, supra note 8 (relating the story of Mark Childress, an inmate who claims that
he feels safer and more comfortable at the private prison than his gang-infested prior facility
in California).
166 William J. Sabol & Heather Couture, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Bulletin NCJ 221944,
PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2007, 5 (2008), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/pdfgpim07.pdf [hereinafter PRISON INMATES].
167 Id. The total number of state prisoners, as of June 30, 2007, was 1,395,916 inmates.
Id. at 1 tbl.1.
168 Id. at 5 tbl.6.
169 See supra note 52 and accompanying text (describing the prevalent reform/rehabilitation
motivation behind the penitentiary system); supra note 149 and accompanying text (quoting
Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944) ("The undoubted aim of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment... was not merely to end slavery but to maintain a system of completely free and
voluntary labor throughout the United States.")).
170 As this Note argues in the next section, the prisoner will need to avoid the Punishment
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II. MAKING THE PRIVATE PRISONER'S CASE FOR "SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY
SERVITUDE"
A. The PlaintiffPrisoner's Standing
Before discussing the merits, it is essential to any constitutional claim to first
establish standing-that the potential plaintiff has suffered an injury "fairly traceable
to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the re-
quested relief."' 7'1 As state governments have subjected prisoners to private incarcer-
ation, a prisoner would most likely bring a Thirteenth Amendment cause of action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.72 In other words, the plaintiff prisoner, to be successful,
would first have to prove that the prisoner's predicament constitutes "slavery" or
"involuntary servitude" in contravention of the Thirteenth Amendment. In both estab-
lishing standing and proving causation, the prisoner would also be required to show
that this involuntary servitude is the result of the state's decision to contract with a
private prison corporation.
B. The Private Prisoner's Thirteenth Amendment Claim
A § 1983 suit to uphold a modem private prisoner's Thirteenth Amendment rights,
like Fourteenth Amendment actions, necessarily requires an analysis of his or her
living and working conditions. 73 Since avoidance of the Punishment Clause must
be based on a historical argument, any parallel between modem private prisoners
Clause by taking an originalist stance: private prison contracts were not the form of incarcer-
ation foreseen by the Thirteenth Amendment drafters when they provided this constitutional
exception. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (discussing the theory of
incarceration that explains the drafters' inclusion of the Punishment Clause).
17' Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
172 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (providing a cause of action to any person who has been de-
prived of his or her constitutional rights "under color of any statute... of any State or Territory
or the District of Columbia"). It is also worth noting that the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act
imposes an extra requirement on prisoners that does not hinder the ordinary citizen before
filing suit. Prior to filing a § 1983 suit, the prisoner must exhaust all available administrative
remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000). Failure to do so renders many prisoner actions frivo-
lous. See Loving v. Johnson, 455 F.3d 562, 563 (5th Cir. 2006) (stating that the District Court
denied petitioner's motion as frivolous under § 1997e). This Note will assume that the prisoner
has exhausted all administrative remedies. It is not entirely clear, however, that complete
exhaustion of remedies is required in prisoner civil rights cases under § 1997e when the target
of the suit is a state rather than the federal government. See Pischke v. Litscher, 178 F.3d
497, 500 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 954 (1999) ("[S]ection 1983 does not in general
require exhaustion of state remedies.").
'73 For a first-hand description of living and working conditions inside a private prison see
K.C. CARCERAL, PRISON, INC.: A CONVICT ExPOSES LIFE INSIDE A PRIVATE PRISON (2006).
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and antebellum slaves, Reconstruction-era leased convicts, or peonage workers is
helpful. 74 Admittedly, most of the prisoners' work is "housework and upkeep of
the prison itself. 175 Some examples include laundry, cleaning duties, library staff-
ing, and food service. 76 Nevertheless, some private prison inmates do produce goods
for private contractors as a result of the Percy Amendment, which exempted certain
prisons from the Sumners-Ashurst Act's ban on prison-made goods. 77 The Percy
Amendment and most state contracts require only "a competitive wage," usually
commensurate with the wage paid to public inmates for the same work.17 1
If one had only this cursory view of the private prisoner's work conditions, he
or she might argue that a Thirteenth Amendment claim is at least irrelevant and at
most ludicrous. Private prisoners perform only menial tasks, and certainly are not
subject to the highway, chain gang-like work that prevailed in convict leasing and
has reemerged in some public prison systems.179 Additionally, no serious legal argu-
ment could be made that these prisoners are being treated as property similar to
antebellum slaves.
Indeed, many courts have adopted this narrow view of modem prison labor, decid-
ing that the Punishment Clause renders the Thirteenth Amendment a nonstarter.18 0
In the private prison context, however, one must place the prisoners' remuneration
and tasks performed in the context of the industry itself. Private prison companies
are publicly traded entities.' 8' CCA, Wackenhut, and others have boards of directors,
shareholders, and executives, all of whom depend on an influx of prisoners to make
a profit. 2 By living in, cleaning, and maintaining the prison, as well as engaging in
other forms of labor either mandated or allowed by the state, the prisoners contribute
to the success of these prisons at annual reviews and among popular perception. Addi-
tionally, prisoner labor reduces corporate costs, as CCA and others do not have to
174 See Weaver & Purcell, supra note 1, at 370; supra Part I.B-C.
171 Quigley, supra note 33, at 1162-63.
176 Id. at 1166.
,77 Weaver & Purcell, supra note 1, at 370.
178 Id.
17' Id. at 361.
180 Cf Pischke v. Litscher, 178 F.3d 497,500 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 954
(1999) (citing a string of cases which "assume the propriety" of private confinement despite the
Thirteenth Amendment); Murray v. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 911 F.2d 1167, 1167 (5th Cir. 1990)
(per curium), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1050 (1991) (citing the Thirteenth Amendment to support
the proposition that "[c]ompelling an inmate to work without pay is not unconstitutional").
18l See Corrections Corporation ofAmerica Investor Relations, http://investor.shareholder
.com/cxw (last visited Aug. 13, 2009) (listing CCA's current stock price and shareholder
information); see also Christian Parenti, Privatized Problems: For-Profit Incarceration in
Trouble, in CAPITALIST PUNISHMENT, supra note 132, at 30, 30-31 (discussing CCA's and
Wackenhut's first public offerings).
182 Parenti, supra note 181, at 31 (listing the early boards of directors of CCA and
Wackenhut).
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hire low-level staff to carry out menial tasks.'83 Cost reduction does not, however,
occur only in prisoners' labor. It is also apparent in their living conditions, with in-
mates receiving meager living conditions and less rehabilitative drug programs in
an effort to turn profits.' 8 The resulting increase in profit margins renders the cor-
poration more successful, and hence more attractive to state legislatures.'85 Conse-
quently, prison labor's contributions to the corporation lead to more state contracts,
and thus further the profit-making objective of the corporation.
Hallett writes, "Under the auspices of prison privatization, crime and criminals
become engines ofprivate investment .... For shareholders in private prison com-
panies, inmates have quite literally become commodities rather than liabilities.' 86
Each shareholder in a private prison company, therefore, has an interest in ensuring
that crime and criminal punishment remain high, and that the prisons are filled and
well kept by prison labor.17 On the other hand, state taxpayers consider prisoners a
drain on resources, giving them an incentive to pressure lawmakers to rehabilitate
them and make them productive members of society.188
Other relevant constitutional differences exist between the prisoner in a private
facility and his public counterparts. Modem public prisoners, like those in the early
Pennsylvania system, are put to work mainly to rehabilitate them and/or teach them
a skill.19 Their low wage is due simply to their prisoner status.' 90 Private prisoners,
however, are placed in cheap living conditions and put to work primarily to cut costs.'19
83 See AusTiN & COVENTRY, supra note 9, at iii ("[lt was discovered that.., the average
saving from privatization was only about 1 percent, and most of that was achieved through
lower labor costs."); Garvey, supra note 36, at 392 ("Requiring prisoners to defray the cost of
incarceration is an old idea, and it's beginning to enjoy renewed popularity.").
'84 Sinden, supra note 132, at 40 (discussing the "comer-cutting" that occurs at private
prisons in order to reduce expenses).
185 See CCA 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 5 ("CCA's sucpess has been due to
a number of factors .... We provide our government partners with a cost-effective way to
manage their growing prison populations while avoiding the large capital expenditures asso-
ciated with new prison construction.").
186 HALLET, supra note 10, at 17-18.
187 For example, in CCA's 2007 annual report, the company stated to its shareholders and
potential investors, "We continue to benefit from a positive environment where the demand
for prison beds exceeds the supply, and we believe CCA is well positioned to take advantage
of this market dynamic." CCA 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 2 (emphasis added).
188 HALLET-r, supra note 10, at 18.
189 Bennett v. Frank, 395 F.3d 409, 410 (7th Cir. 2005).
190 Murray v. Miss. Dep't ofCorr., 911 F.2d 1167, 1168 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1050 (1991) ("[C]ompensating prisoners for work is not a constitutional
requirement but, rather, is by the grace of the state.") (quoting Mikeska v. Collins, 900 F.2d
833, 837 (5th Cir. 1990)).
'' AusTIN & COVENTRY, supra note 9, at 29-30 ("Privatization opponents are concerned
about possible deterioration in the quality of inmate services. History shows that privately
operated facilities are often plagued by problems associated with the quest for higher
earnings."); Dolovich, supra note 17, at 474.
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Additionally, states hire, train, and equip the officers that oversee their correctional
facilities. 912 This renders the state liable for the actions of prison wardens, guards,
and support staff under the "state action" doctrine for any civil rights violations. 1
93
Private prison employees, on the other hand do not have the same status.' 94
With all of these factors under consideration, one begins to formulate a Thirteenth
Amendment case for the private prisoner plaintiff, even if he or she only sweeps the
floors and cleans the bathrooms. After sentence is imposed, the prisoner, via a con-
tract between the state and a private prison company, is sent to a private correctional
facility. The prisoner is then made to work under the direction of prison guards hired
by the corporate office for little to no wages. Also, the prisoner is forced to live in
more meager conditions than state prisoners as a corporate cost-cutting measure. 95
Finally, both their living and working conditions serve the notion that a private prison
is cheaper and more efficient than the alternative, which helps the corporation secure
more state contracts and increase the value of shareholders' investments.
96
At the very least, the private prison corporation in this scenario parallels the state
contractors who took advantage of the vagrancy laws to gain cheap labor through con-
vict leasing. 97 At the worst, however, the exploitation of criminals' lives for profit is
a "badge or incident" of slavery under cases such as Turner or Pollock. Whether one
agrees or disagrees with these statements, all can agree that this situation is certainly
not the "involuntary servitude" allowed by the Thirteenth Amendment's framers under
the Punishment Clause.
C. Preparing for Trial: An Analysis of the Case Law
Since the private prison boom, courts have had varied attitudes toward the status
of these new prisons and the Thirteenth Amendment. While no case addressing this
precise issue has ever come before the Supreme Court, a number of federal appellate
courts have had the opportunity to address Thirteenth Amendment arguments in re-
lation to private prisoners. Nevertheless, the typical response is to entirely dismiss
the issue. Relying on the notion, supported by Slaughter-House Cases and the Civil
Rights Cases, that the Thirteenth Amendment is relegated to history, a federal court
192 Cf Joshua Miller, Worker Rights in Private Prisons, in CAPrrALIST PUNISHMENT, supra
note 132, at 140, 142 (discussing the disparities in hiring and salaries of state guards versus
private guards).
... Sarro v. Cornell Corr., Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 52,60-61 (D.R.I. 2003) ("[ljmmunity for
prison guards arose 'out of their status as public employees at common law' .... [T]he
detention of individuals... is an exclusively governmental function.") (quoting Richardson
v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 404-05 (1997)).
194 See discussion ofRichardson v. McKnight, infra notes 228-45 and accompanying text.
'9' See HALLETr, supra note 10, at 17-18.
196 See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
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is more likely to move on to potential Fourteenth Amendment, Eighth Amendment,
or statutory claims.
One early example is United States v. Olson.9 8 The defendants argued at trial
that the war draft constituted a condition of involuntary servitude in violation of the
Thirteenth Amendment. 99 Borrowing exact language from an earlier Supreme Court
case, the court stated that "the term 'involuntary servitude' was intended to cover
those forms of compulsory labor akin to African slavery, which in practical operation
would tend to produce like undesirable results. 2 °° Without analyzing the specific
condition imposed on American males by the Selective Service Act, the court moved
on to the defendant's Fifth Amendment claim.2 1
More recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals engaged in the same dismissive
behavior. In Watson v. Graves,2 °2 a Louisiana sheriff and prison warden instituted
a work-release program in which prisoners could work outside thejail for private indi-
viduals or businesses. 2 3 Two prisoners assigned to work for the sheriff's daughter
and son-in-law sued under § 1983, claiming that the program violated the Thirteenth
Amendment and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).20 4 In hardly one page, the
court disposed of the prisoners' Thirteenth Amendment argument. 25 To the conten-
tion that the Punishment Clause did not apply to the prisoners because labor was not
imposed as a sentence, the court answered that it was irrelevant because the plain-
tiffs had not been subjected to involuntary servitude.20 6 The court stated, "Involun-
tary servitude is defined as 'an action by the master causing the servant to have, or
to believe he has, no way to avoid continued service or confinement.' 20 7 Conse-
quently, if the prisoner has a choice, there is no involuntary servitude.20 8 Combined
with the Punishment Clause's general idea that "the requirement that incarcerated
prisoners work without pay does not constitute involuntary servitude in violation of
the [T]hirteenth [A]mendment," then, the prisoners had no legitimate claim, and the
court proceeded to the FLSA arguments. 20 9 No discussion of the condition created
198 253 F. 233 (W.D. Wash. 1917).
199 Id. at 238.
200 Id. (quoting Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916)).
201 Id.
202 909 F.2d 1549 (5th Cir. 1990).
203 Id. at 1551.
204 Id. at 1550 n.1.
205 Id. at 1552-53.
206 Id. at 1553.
207 Id. at 1552 (quoting United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 486 (2d Cir. 1964)).
208 Id. at 1552-53 ("The choice of whether to work outside of the jail.., or remain inside
the jail... may have indeed been 'painful' and quite possibly illegal under state law, but the
evidence shows that neither [plaintiff] was forced to work or continued to work against his
will.").
209 Id. at 1552.
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by the work-release program, and whether it was a "badge or incident" of slavery
as required by prior Thirteenth Amendment cases, ever occurred in the opinion.
21 0
Pischke v. Litscher stands as one notable exception to the general dearth of case
law directly pitting the Thirteenth Amendment against the privatized prison system,
albeit in dicta. 1 Petitioner Pischke, a Wisconsin inmate, filed a habeas corpus peti-
tion with the local federal district court. 2  He claimed that the Wisconsin statute
authorizing the State to enter into contracts with out-of-state private prisons to house
prisoners violated the Thirteenth Amendment.2 3 Chief Judge Posner affirmed the
district court's denial of the petition, holding that "[t]he challenge here is not to being
in custody, but to the location in which one is in custody., 214 Such arguments, he
continued, are best brought as § 1983 challenges to the inmate's living conditions in
private prisons.215 Though this determination adequately disposed of the case, Posner
further warned, in dicta, that it would be "foolish" for the petitioner to attempt to refile
his claim.216 By bringing a § 1983 claim under the Thirteenth Amendment, private
prison inmates "will merely waste their money and earn a strike." '217 Defending his
statement, Posner launched a full attack on the Thirteenth Amendment's applicability
to private prisons:
The Thirteenth Amendment, which forbids involuntary servi-
tude, has an express exception for persons imprisoned pursuant
to conviction for crime. Nor are we pointed to or can think of
any other provision of the Constitution that might be violated by
the decision of a state to confine a convicted prisoner in a prison
owned by a private firm rather than by a government. A number
of cases assume the propriety of such confinements.... 2 8
The Seventh Circuit, as a result, effectively employed the Punishment Clause to
foreclose prisoners-whether incarcerated by the state or a private entity-from ever
bringing Thirteenth Amendment claims. "A prisoner has a legally protected interest
in the conduct of his keeper," Posner concluded, "but not in the keeper's identity. Let
Wisconsin prisoners have no doubt of the complete lack of merit of their Thirteenth
Amendment claims." ' 9  Interestingly, however, Posner's only support for this
21. See supra note 122 (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 35 (1883) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
21 178 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 954 (1999).
212 Id. at 499.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 499-500 (emphasis added).
215 Id. at 500.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 id.
219 Id. at 500-01 (internal citations omitted).
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contention was that no court had "opined to the contrary," and that one non-majority
judge had "said the practice is constitutional., 2
By far, Pischke is the strongest use of the amendment's language. The Fifth
Circuit, for example, came to the same essential conclusion, but at least analyzed the
Thirteenth Amendment claim and did not foreclose the possibility of a successful
prisoner plaintiff.22' Later, in Loving v. Johnson, the court stated that prisoners fit the
definition of "employees" under the FLSA when made to work for a private firm, but
they could never be employees of the prison.222 Due to the fact that the inmate worked
"in and for the prison" as a launderer, therefore, the court denied his FLSA claim.
Nevertheless, the court still failed to discuss the prisoner's constitutional status when
the prison and the private firm are one and the same.
Despite Posner's strict adherence to a strong Punishment Clause regardless of
prison identity,24 the judiciary's history of considering punishment a state function,225
other circuits' failure to adopt uniform standards,226 and the Supreme Court's view
of private prisons all suggest that the Supreme Court may disagree with Pischke.227
Instead of finding that identity of the incarcerator is irrelevant, the Supreme Court has
clearly held that private versus public is an important distinction in the prison con-
text.228 In Richardson v. McKnight, a prisoner in a Tennessee private prison sued his
guards for a § 1983 violation. 229 The guards responded that they were immune from
such lawsuits under the doctrine of "qualified immunity," as they were acting under
color of state law.230 The Court rejected this argument, however, stating that "[h]istory
220 Id. at 500 (citing Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139, 1161-62 (2d Cir. 1995)
(Jacobs, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
221 See Murray v. Miss. Dep't of Corr., 911 F.2d 1167, 1167-68 (5th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam) (holding that a state inmate is not entitled to damages for work without pay because
the Thirteenth Amendment allows involuntary servitude as punishment for crime).
222 See 455 F.3d 562, 563 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
223 Id.
224 See supra text accompanying note 216.
225 See supra note 142 and accompanying text (addressing Reynolds, Pollock, and the state's
central role inj udicial determinations of labor as punishment under the Thirteenth Amendment).
226 Compare Ali v. Johnson, 259 F.3d 317, 318 (5th Cir. 2001) (describing Watson as "an
anomaly in federal jurisprudence" and holding that no issue of involuntary servitude arises
in prisoner cases on private property, though not specifically private prisons), with Davis v.
Hudson, No. 00-6115,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18913, at *8-*9 (10th Cir. Aug. 4,2000) (dis-
agreeing with Pischke and holding that "[t]here is a very significant difference between a
state permitting a private person to hold another in involuntary servitude and a state contracting
with a private party to administer a facility," and recognizing that there may be cases of private
prisoner exploitation that could take the prisoner's involuntary servitude claim outside of the
Thirteenth Amendment's "state imprisonment exception.").
227 See infra text accompanying notes 224-26.
228 See, e.g., Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997) (denying private prison guards
§ 1983 qualified immunity).
229 Id. at 401.
230 Id. at 401-02.
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does not reveal a 'firmly rooted' tradition of immunity applicable to privately em-
ployed prison guards. 2' As the private prison management "firm is systematically
organized to perform a major administrative task for profit," the state's contract
"grant[s] this private firm freedom to respond to those market pressures through re-
wards and penalties that operate directly upon its employees." '232 Since these aspects
of the private firm can control the behavior of employees, the immunity typically
granted to a public prison guard as a government employee is unnecessary.233
Two important aspects ofRichardson must be mentioned with regard to a potential
Thirteenth Amendment claim. First, the Court insulated the public prison system from
liability for the actions of the private prisons with whom it contracts. 3 4 Implicitly,
then, the Court also recognized that private prison companies and states' departments
of corrections are two different entities with different interests.235 As other courts have
held, the government's interest is in rehabilitating the offender.236 The private prison,
on the other hand, exists solely for profit.2 37 Given the Supreme Court's recognition
of this function, it becomes easier to make the argument that, in the private prison's
hands, an inmate plaintiff is subjected to slavery-like conditions. He is dehumanized
to nothing more than a commodity-being sustained at a modest price while used to
increase the value of CCA's, Wackenhut's, and similar companies' shares.238
Second, Richardson creates the possibility of a claim against private prison offi-
cials for constitutional rights violations.239 If a private inmate can bring an action
against the officials who hold him, unlike his counterparts in the public prison, one
must ask which of the prisoners' rights render that distinction important and thus give
meaning to this right to sue. As even the Seventh Circuit has held, prisoners are not
"employees" as defined in the FLSA.24' Rights given to employees are obtained by
contract, whereas prisoners have not contracted with either the state or the private
prison company to perform services.2"' Instead, prisoners have been "taken out of
231 Id. at 404.
232 Id. at 409-10.
233 See id. at411.
234 See White, supra note 7, at 138.
235 See Richardson, 521 U.S. at 412 ("The organizational structure is one subject to the
ordinary competitive pressures that normally help private firms adjust their behavior...
pressures not necessarily present in government departments.").
236 SeeBennettv. Frank, 395 F.3d409, 410 (7th Cir. 2005) ("If [the prison] puts [inmates] to
work, it is to... keep them out of mischief, or to ease their transition to the world outside, or
to equip them with skills and habits that will make them less likely to return to crime outside.").
237 See Richardson, 521 U.S. at 409 ("[CCA] is systematically organized to perform a major
administrative task for profit.").
238 See Dolovich, supra note 17, at 474-75 (discussing the pressure private prison com-
panies receive from shareholders and contracting states to "economize," and the effects it has
on prisoners).
239 See id. at 486.
240 See Sanders v. Hayden, 544 F.3d 812, 814 (7th Cir. 2008); Bennett, 395 F.3d at 409.
241 See Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1395 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[Prisoners] 'have not
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the national economy" to work toward their rehabilitation.24 2 The circuits are,
therefore, essentially in accord with the idea that a prisoner never has the right to sue
for labor rights.
In determining that the public-private distinction is immaterial regarding a
prisoner's right to wages, Posner reasoned that "neither the rights nor the liabilities
of a state agency should be affected by its decision to contract out a portion of the
services that state law obligates it to provide., 24 3 Richardson, however, clearly holds
that a state agency's liabilities are affected by its decision to send inmates to a private
facility. Once the agency does so, it effectively requires the prisoner to seek relief
against his private holders and not the state.2" Not only are these suits allowable,
Richardson's public jail versus private prison distinction practically requires the in-
mate, if he wants to challenge his conditions, to sue the private corrections corporation
or challenge its contract with the state under § 1983.245
The isolation and liability of the private prison industry created by Richardson
could prove extremely beneficial to an inmate seeking redress under the Thirteenth
Amendment.2' Though the Supreme Court has held those who work in private prisons
to be performing state action sufficient to satisfy § 1983,247 finding state action is irrel-
evant in the Thirteenth Amendment context. It regulates both private and public acts
that create the "badges and incidents" of slavery.24 Regarding the prison work per-
formed by private inmates, then, there is only one remaining question: If prisoners
contracted with the government to become its employees. Rather, they are working as part
of their sentences of incarceration."') (quoting Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 810 (7th
Cir. 1992)).
242 Id.
243 Bennett, 395 F.3d at 410.
244 Compare Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399,411 (1997) ("Hence ajudicial determi-
nation that 'effectiveness' concerns warrant special immunity-type protection in respect to
[the governmental] system does not prove its need in respect to the [private prison system]."),
with White, supra note 7, at 139 ("Notwithstanding McKnight's clarifying functions, then, the
state still seems able to reduce its level of legal responsibility to inmates when it incarcerates
them in private prisons.").
245 These suits based on the contract are still possible because, although the Court ruled
that private prison guards are not state actors for purposes of immunity, Richardson left open
the question of the state's involvement in § 1983 liability. See Paul Howard Morris, The Impact
ofConstitutional Liability on the Privatization Movement After Richardson v. McKnight, 52
VAND. L. REV. 489, 516 (1999).
246 But see Dolovich, supra note 17, at 486 (arguing that Richardson may not make much
difference to private prisoners, as the right prisoners seek to assert must be "clearly established"
before it can survive).
247 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54 (1988).
248 See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911) ("'[T]he Amendment is not a mere
prohibition of state laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that
slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States."') (quoting
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)).
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are not employees of the private firm, and they are not under state custody, what is
their condition? The only plausible answer seems to be an illegal one-that of private
indentured servants.
D. The Prisoner Plaintif's Rights and Chances for Success
Under these circumstances, a Supreme Court claim for a private prisoner under
the Thirteenth Amendment is at least plausible, if not potentially successful. Under
Richardson, the state, when it performs its contract with the private prison firm, essen-
tially removes the inmates from its purview when it requires their incarceration at
sentencing and then transfers them to a private facility. It places them on private
property under the supervision of private officers, who are treated by the Supreme
Court as members of a profit-driven, cost-reducing system that does not share the
public prison philosophy of rehabilitation and inmate reform.249 At least one circuit
has held that a prisoner is an "employee" under FLSA when the state department of
corrections sends him to work for a private firm.25° Nevertheless, they can never be
employees of their prisons, either public or private, because "[p]eople are not impris-
oned for the purpose of enabling them to earn a living. '25' The private prison thus
exploits these prisoners to make profit with the state's permission, while the prisoners
are legally forbidden from being considered its employees and taking part of that rev-
enue. As such, their condition appears to be that of involuntary servants akin to ante-
bellum slaves, the "Chinese coolie[s]," or "Mexican peonage" victims mentioned by
Justice Miller.252
Contrary to Pischke and similar cases, the legislative and judicial history of the
Punishment Clause does not allow the establishment of involuntary servitude alone
to dispose of the question.253 It allows a prisoner, duly convicted of a crime, to be
compelled to work without pay during the period of incarceration.2 4 Nevertheless,
the history of this clause in both Congress and the courts speaks against Posner's
249 Compare Richardson, 521 U.S. at 410 (finding that private prison corporations are driven
by the market's competitive pressures), with Bennett v. Frank, 395 F.3d 409, 410 (7th Cir.
2005) (distinguishing prisoners from employees because the purpose of their work is either
to offset costs, keep them out of trouble, or equip them with skills for the outside world).
250 See Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1556 (5th Cir. 1990).
251 Bennett, 395 F.3d at 410.
252 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 72 (1872).
253 See supra note 141 and accompanying text (arguing that the prohibition against involun-
tary servitude was included for the protection of free labor, and therefore any allowable com-
pulsory labor must be separated from the right of free citizens to choose their profession, enter
contracts, etc.); see also Bailey, 219 U.S. at 241 (holding that the purpose of the Thirteenth
Amendment was "to make labor free").
254 See AMAR, supra note 16, at 359 (distinguishing involuntary servitude of prisoners
because they have been deprived oftheir liberty via due process, thus not offending the rights
of free laborers).
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conclusion and holds that the incarcerator's identity does matter. The Punishment
Clause was drafted at a time when criminal punishment was considered a function of
the state, and was totally under the state's control.
As Justice Bradley noted in Pollock, forced labor is a punishment "which society
may compel," but otherwise labor in the United States must be free and voluntary.2"
The Thirteenth Amendment was never meant to authorize criminals to be put to work
against their will for a profit motive, as indeed that would violate the amendment's
spirit at the time of its drafting. Instead, the exception was made due to the state's
different motives in forcing a prisoner to work, i.e., rehabilitation and turning the
prisoner into a prosperous taxpayer rather than a tax consumer. As private prison
corporations' motives differ, the Court could consider their actions in housing and
working inmates, and the state's actions facilitating them, to constitute a "badge or
incident" of involuntary servitude similar to a convict lease system. The logical con-
clusion, then, is that state private prison contracts, and indeed the industry in its cur-
rent form, violate the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against such activity.
III. TURNING THE PRIVATE PRISON PUBLIC: A PROPOSED SOLUTION
Despite the Thirteenth Amendment concerns, it is a bit unrealistic to call for the
complete shutdown of the private prison industry. Its recent popularity and wide use
would cause even the Supreme Court to pause at such a suggestion. It is, after all, a
billion dollar industry.256 Additionally, these prisons have been lauded for bringing
needed economic investment and jobs to poverty stricken rural areas.257 The good
news, however, is that these prisons do not have to go away, or even lose profitability,
in order to avoid Thirteenth Amendment concerns. As this Note has argued, the major
historical and constitutional problem with incarcerating prisoners and putting them
to work, as one California prison official has admitted, is that it is a "core state func-
tion., 258 If these prisons and their employees were brought under the purview of the
state, therefore, the Thirteenth Amendment issue of private exploitation would dis-
sipate.2 9 After all, the Thirteenth Amendment certainly allows the state to compel
255 Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17-18 (1944).
256 See White, supra note 7, at 134.
257 Sinden, supra note 132, at 44; see Leslie Berestein, Company Wants to Builda Mega-
Prison in County, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 20, 2008, at Al, available at http://www
.signonsandiego.com/news/metro/20080320-9999-1n2Occal.html (describing a CCA illegal
immigrant detention facility contract, which will create 375 jobs).
258 Lifsher, supra note 8; see also United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 149 (1914).
259 This solution, legislatively converting the constructed prison into a quasi-state entity,
has been suggested elsewhere in other contexts. See David J. DelFiandra, The Growth of
Prison Privatization and the Threat Posed by 42 US.C. § 1983,38 DuQ. L. REv. 591, 615-16
(2000) (suggesting the legislative imposition of"quasi-private" prisons to resolve the immunity
problem created by Richardson).
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post-conviction involuntary servitude via the Punishment Clause. 260 As the federal
government and the states hold the responsibility for both their criminal punishment
systems and procurement regimes, even the Supreme Court has recognized that
legislatures must take action within their administrative codes to remove the taint
of prisoner civil rights violations in private facilities. 6
For each state, there are statutes and/or provisions in its administrative code re-
garding the solicitation and award of prison construction and operation contracts.262
When these contracts were first distributed in the 1980s, the haste to privatize cor-
rections led many states to be lenient in oversight and accountability standards. This
has led to problems with prison guard training, abuse of prisoners, and corruption in
the twenty-first century. 263 Understandably, Reagan-era beliefs reinforced the notion
that all the state had to do was pay the contract price, and the rest would be taken over
by the private firm. The lack of oversight of private prison officials, however, was the
impetus for Eighth Amendment, FLSA, and Thirteenth Amendment legal arguments
that followed as well as the exposure to liability set forth in Richardson.6
Nearly all states that allow private prison contracting require some form of re-
porting, usually that the prisons comply with the standards outlined by the American
Correctional Association (ACA).265 Some scholars nonetheless scoff at this require-
ment since ACA accredited facilities are considered among the worst in the nation.266
Tennessee, the birthplace of CCA and the first state to privatize, has one of the most
relaxed standards. 267 The Tennessee Code explicitly states that the private firm, not
the state, employs the guards and is responsible for them.268 The District of Columbia,
possibly due to its small size and great need to send prisoners elsewhere, is also quite
lenient in its standards, simply allowing prisoners to be shipped to any prison "operated
or contracted for by the Bureau of Prisons. 269 In fact, D.C.'s administrative code
260 See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236,240 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that the state
may compel a prisoner to work at any time post-conviction, even pending appeal, as long as
the conviction is presumptively valid).
261 Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 72 (2001) ("Whether it makes sense to im-
pose asymmetrical liability costs on private prison facilities alone is a question for Congress,
not us, to decide.").
262 See Sinden, supra note 132, at 45; see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 6031.6 (West 2000);
VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-262 (2005).
263 Sinden, supra note 132, at 45; see also Lifsher, supra note 8 ("Critics counter that
states that use private prisons get what they pay for: Guards are poorly paid and trained, and
private prisons experience more escapes and more disciplinary problems that state-run
institutions. . .").
264 See supra Part II.C.
265 See Dolovich, supra note 17, at 488.
266 See Sinden, supra note 132, at 45.
267 See Greene, supra note 4, at 11-12 (outlining how CCA has "prospered greatly" in
Tennessee due to its two legislative bids to take over the state's prison system).
268 TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-113 (West 2008).
269 D.C. CODE § 24-101(a) (2001) (emphasis added).
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goes on to list specific types and numbers of prisoners who will be committed to
private facilities, with only slight mention of the status of private prison employees.27
California is better in this regard, requiring reporting and sanctions if health and
safety laws are violated, but it still does not provide for state liability or conditions
placed in the initial contract.271 Texas and Arkansas, by contrast, are relatively new
to prison privatization compared to other states and thus are still developing their
contracting laws. However, no trend has appeared that would suggest greater state
oversight of private prisons.27 2
In reviewing the state codes, therefore, a scheme similar to that adopted by
Virginia seems to have come the closest to avoiding the Thirteenth Amendment
problem. Its Corrections Private Management Act (CPMA) authorizes the public
procurement of private prison contracts, but it is accompanied by an extensive portion
of the Virginia Administrative Code.273 In those regulations, Virginia requires private
prisons to compensate inmates at levels commensurate to the state department of cor-
rections pay schedule,274 send its employees to the same training that public prison
guards receive,275 and report all revenue-producing activities to the state. 276 Further-
more, the CPMA does not allow the state prison authority to delegate the determination
of inmate work performed or wages received to the private prison corporation.277 In
other words, if the inmate works or is paid, it is at the behest and benefit of the state.
Essentially, this code makes private prisons an arm of the state. It takes the living
conditions, work environment, and cost-cutting incentives out of the private contractor's
hands, and redirects them toward the state agency. The contract, essentially, is for
the construction and daily management of the prison-and nothing more. The guards
must be trained and the prison is subject to stringent and regular reporting stan-
dards. 278 This facet is especially important since one of the greatest civil rights criti-
cisms against private prisons is the lack of accountability and oversight.279 By pulling
oversight, prison employees, and inmate conditions back under the state umbrella,
Virginia's procurement system takes the privately held inmate out of the profit-driven
environment and reestablishes rehabilitation as the goal of incarceration, thus answer-
ing both the immunity problem of Richardson and the exploitation factor shunned
by the Supreme Court's early Thirteenth Amendment cases.
270 Id. at § 24-101(c).
27 CAL. PENAL CODE § 6031.6(b)(3), (c) (West 2000).
272 See AUSTIN & COvENTRY, supra note 9, at 25 (stating that Texas even requires cost-
cutting as a legislative prerequisite to contracting with a private prison corporation).
273 Corrections Private Management Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-261 to -267 (2005).
274 6 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 15-45-200 (2003).
275 Id. at § 15-45-1930.
276 Id. at § 15-45-190.
277 VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-265(4) (2005).
278 See 6 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 15-45-150 (2003), id. at § 15-45-70.
279 Sinden, supra note 132, at 45.
246 [Vol. 18:213
PRISONERS FOR SALE
Due to Virginia's administrative safeguards, its procurement regime is the most
successful at avoiding any Thirteenth Amendment concerns. As a further benefit, its
takeover of prison management reduces the amount of other § 1983 suits that could
be brought due to unmonitored prison abuses. On the other hand, there is a down-
side to having such strict standards. As of 2003, Virginia only had one private prison
within its borders.80 In 2008, Virginia's private prison inmates numbered a mere
1579. 2s While this number may be small, Virginia inmates in private prisons can
at least be sure that it is the Commonwealth holding them and putting them to work
without the taint of exploitation by a board of directors. The administrative code
effectively removes the incentive for legislators to reduce oversight of prison condi-
tions in the name of cutting costs. Finally, by maintaining the state's responsibility
over Virginia inmates, the code also allows the state to focus on other ways of
reducing its prison population.2 2
CONCLUSION
Since the Thirteenth Amendment's passage in 1865, three distinct interpretations
of the Punishment Clause have emerged. The first considered the entire amendment
dead letter after African slavery was abolished, and the second allowed the state to
punish its criminals, i.e., those convicted and deprived of liberty via due process,
through work as a dedication to Penn and the early penitentiary reformers. The third,
which became apparent after the private prison boom of the 1980s evidenced by
Pischke and other circuit cases, disturbingly neglects the state's role in incarceration
and assumes that the Punishment Clause is an absolute bar to prisoners' claims of
involuntary servitude. Given the profit-driven motive of these corporations, the
rising inmate population, and the widespread failure of the criminal justice system to
prevent recidivism, such ajudicial stance could be extremely harmful to the nation's
attempts to improve its punishment regimes.
Many scholars have asserted the moral problems accompanying the recent private
exploitation of inmates. By combining the Supreme Court's early rulings on the
Thirteenth Amendment with its recent decision in Richardson, a moral argument can
be made into a viable legal argument. A state, by contracting its inmates out of a reha-
bilitative system and into the marketplace, subjects them to involuntary servitude that
constitutes a badge or incident of slavery. The Supreme Court is at least poised to
render such a decision. By pulling the inmates and prison employees back under the
public umbrella via their procurement standards, states and the federal government
can do much to avoid the issues that bristle the feathers of scholars, civil rights groups,
and prison guard unions.
280 See Parenti, supra note 181, at 35.
281 See Ronald Fraser, Editorial, Virginia's Prison Gravy Train, ROANOKE TIMES, Mar. 28,
2008, at B9, available at http://www.roanoke.com/ditorials/commentary/wb/156157.
282 See id. (discussing Virginia's need to reduce state prison populations by ridding the
criminal code of mandatory minimums, which are championed by private prison corporations).
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